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Abstract 
Climate change presents the greatest challenge ever faced by our domestic and international 
institutions, and great deal of the difficulty lies in the science of the issue. Because human influence 
on global climate differs in important ways from other environmental threats these peculiarities set the 
context for discussion of what can be done to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to change 
that cannot be avoided. Following a brief summary of current understanding of how Earth’s climate 
works, five ways are presented by which the science of climate impinges on attempts to construct a 
policy response. 
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1. The climate challenge 
Societies have been dealing with environmental threats for centuries, each problem presenting its own 
set of institutional difficulties. Managing human influence on the Planet’s climate presents a challenge 
beyond any confronted before, however, and the roots of the difficulty lie in the underlying science of 
the issue. Here we review our understanding of how the Earth system works and ways our activity is 
influencing it, and explore the reasons why the issue so severely challenges the mental capability 
developed in human evolution and the political institutions developed along the way. 
1.1 Origins of the Science of Earth’s Climate 
Knowledge of the threat of climate change, and the policy challenges it presents, are founded mainly 
on scientific calculation. There is anecdotal evidence in our day-to-day experience that changes 
projected by scientific analysis are already taking place—for example in the earlier flowering of plants 
in some parts of the world, changes in migration patterns of birds, and increases in record high 
temperatures and intense storms. Also, thermometer and other measurements show an increase in 
global temperature over the past 150 years, but even these estimates require scientific analysis to 
convert widely distributed and sometimes sparse measurements into a global picture. Looking 
forward, projection of the response of the climate to human intervention is wholly a matter of research 
on the complicated interactions within the earth system, and simulation in computer models. So where 
does this knowledge base come from? The history is a long one, dating at least to the early 19
th
 
Century when Jean Baptiste Joseph Fourier, the great French mathematician and physical scientist, 
calculated that, given its distance from the Sun, the Earth should be cooler than it is. Among his 
hypotheses was the possibility that something in the atmosphere was acting as an insulator. Discovery 
of what might be the cause came with the work of the Irish scientist John Tyndall who in 1861 showed 
that water vapor and CO2 can trap radiant energy. Then in 1896 a Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius, 
who was seeking to understand what caused the ice ages, concluded that the CO2 added to the 
atmosphere could raise global temperature. He computed that a doubling of its atmospheric 
concentration would yield a 4°C increase, an estimate somewhat higher than current calculations but 
amazingly close considering the climate system knowledge and computation facilities at his disposal. 
One forecast Arrhenius got wrong: based on his expectation for the emerging industrial age and the 
absorption of CO2 in the Earth system he thought it would take several thousand years to burn enough 
fossil fuels to yield an atmospheric doubling. In fact we are on a track to pass that milestone in the 
next few decades. 
During World War II substantial advances were made in meteorology, and in following decades the 
computer revolution produced dramatic increases in the capacity for numerical calculation. Over time, 
facilities developed originally for numerical weather forecasting were extended to longer-term climate 
projections; eventually these were coupled to models of ocean behavior; and still later representations 
were added of the influence of the terrestrial biosphere. Also, governments supported growing 
programs of earth observations to support this research and analysis, so that by the turn of the 21
st
 
Century several billion U.S. dollars per year were being spent on climate research and observation in 
the U.S. Europe, Japan, Australia and several other countries. 
This activity gained a major push in the 1970s when environmental threats were gaining greater 
salience in many countries, and summaries of then-current scientific knowledge supported the 
expectation that human emissions were at levels that could change the climate. In the U.S., for 
example, the so-called Charney Report commissioned by the President’s Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (US NAS, 1979) played an important role in raising concern about the issue and 
increasing public and policymaker confidence in the ability of the emerging science to understand it. 
By the late 1990s political concern with the issue was rising and, to gain some coherence and quality 
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control in the information being developed, governments created the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) with the task of periodically summarizing the research and analysis. 
As of this writing work on the science of climate has spread around the world, and the IPCC is near 
completion of its Fifth Assessment Report (the AR-5). The science volume of the AR-5 will 
summarize results of climate projections by over a dozen large-scale models from the U.S. EU, Japan 
and Australia. The most complete of these models—the atmospheric-ocean general circulation 
models—are among of the largest numerical calculations ever attempted. Not surprisingly considering 
the complexity of the earth system, these efforts yield different projection of future climate, and even 
the spread among the models does not fully reflect the uncertainty. Thus in exploring the implications 
of the climate science for policy we are talking in the main about knowledge developed in these 
research and analysis activities, and the Earth observation systems that underlie them, and about the 
level of understanding of this work among the media, political leaders and the public. 
1.2 Where the Science Impinges on Policy 
Five characteristics of the issue can be identified that are particularly important in conditioning 
potential responses to the threat—either by reducing greenhouse emissions and other influences or by 
taking measures to ease adaptation to change that cannot be avoided: 
 Scientific understanding of the planet contradicts our common mental model of environmental 
threats. 
 There is not just one source of the climate change threat. Many and varied types of activities 
contribute to the human influence and some are hard to measure. 
 Reduction of the threat requires emissions mitigation by many nations, rich and poor, creating a 
“commons” problem more complex than the world has confronted before. 
 Uncertainty in scientific analysis of the response of global climate to greenhouse emissions 
complicates the process of deciding mitigation action. 
 The effects of climate change at the local level are even more uncertain than at a global scale, yet 
it is at the local and regional levels where adaptation takes place. 
In combination they present a challenge that thus far is proving to be beyond the coping capacity of 
our national and international institutions.  
To see the depth of the problem, consider a comparison with another familiar environmental insult: 
health issues from the pollution of surface waters by human waste. We understand the main source of 
the problem—the sewer outflow of urban areas—and we have developed ways to allocate the cleanup 
cost in a politically acceptable manner. Moreover, we understand pretty well what will happen to 
stream quality if various treatment methods are applied. And finally, conditions at local scale are not 
hard to predict, and effects of adaptation to any residual risk (e.g., boiling water, purchase of bottled 
water) are easy to understand. It is not that these issues present no challenges to private decisions and 
public institutions, but what problems as there are do not reside in the science of water pollution. 
We will return to these peculiar aspects of the climate threat, but first it is useful to work through a 
brief summary of current scientific understanding of how our planet works, to prepare a shared base of 
knowledge of system function and the terminology use to describe it.
1
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 A useful supplement to what follows is the Policymakers Summary if the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 
1997a) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spm.html. 
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2. How our climate system works 
2.1 The Earth, the Sun and the Greenhouse Effect 
At the most fundamental level our climate is determined by the Earth’s relationship to the Sun. Energy 
comes in from the Sun and is radiated back to space, and if these two are in balance the global 
temperature will be constant. If the energy sent out is less than that coming in the Planet will warm, 
and vice versa. It’s as simple as that at one level: human-emitted greenhouse gases hold more of the 
incoming energy in the system. 
The story at a more complete level is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the flows of energy in 
and out of the Earth and the feedbacks within the system. A common unit of energy flow in climate 
analysis, used in this figure, is Watts per square meter of the Earth’s surface (W/m2).2  
Figure 1. Estimates of the Earth’s global mean energy balance (Kiehl and Trenberth, 2007) 
 
The figure shows the Earth in balance with the sun and outer space, with these exchanges shown 
across the top of the figure. Incoming solar radiation, mainly at short wave lengths, is 342 W/m
2
, and 
this is balanced by 107 W/m2 reflected to space at its original wavelengths, some from clouds and 
some from the surface, and 235 W/m
2 
outgoing as longwave (infrared) radiation. Longwave radiation 
is given off by any warm body (the phenomenon exploited by the night scope on a soldier’s weapon). 
The key to a livable planet is shown in the right hand part of the figure. While reflected solar 
radiation passes back out of the system without interacting with molecules in the atmosphere, the 
longwave radiation does interact, reflecting 324 W/m2 back to the surface. The most important of 
these substances is water vapor, but also significant even in this picture of balance is a set of other 
natural greenhouses (GHGs) such as CO2, methane, nitrous oxide and others to be discussed below. 
Now enter humans. We contribute additional volumes of the natural GHGs plus some we have 
                                                     
2
 Think of it this way: if you hold you hand at a distance of 3 meters from a 100 Watt radiant heater (which is sending heat 
in all directions) then your hand is receiving a bit more than 1 Watt of energy flow per m2 of its area, because the surface 
area of a sphere is 4r2, so the area of a sphere with r=3 m is 113 m2. 
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invented, which has the effect of augmenting the 324 W/m
2 
back radiation in the figure. More trapped 
heat warms the planet until the its hotter surface augments the previous outflow of longwave radiation 
to space by enough to restore balance.  
Then there are additional phenomena that can be discussed using this figure. Human activity affects 
the reflection of solar radiation in two ways. White aerosols—mainly sulfate particles formed from 
sulfur emissions of coal-fired powerplants—increase reflection, with a cooling influence. And we 
influence the reflectivity of the surface, its so-called albedo, by changes in land use and by cutting the 
reflectivity of snow and ice by dirtying it with soot, which is produced mainly by Diesel engines and 
biomass burning. Not shown in the figure is another influence: black aerosols which absorb radiation, 
warming the atmosphere. The combined influence of these various effects is commonly referred to the 
anthropogenic “forcing” of the climate, also in W/m2. 
Also to be noted while looking at Figure 1 are positive feedbacks that accompany warming of the 
planet, to be discussed later. Warmer ocean and atmospheric temperatures lead to loss of snow and ice, 
which lowers the reflection of solar radiation from the surface, and aerosols have an effect on cloud 
formation, which influences their complex role in the energy budget. And, most important, a warmer 
atmosphere will hold more water vapor, increasing the power of the most important of the greenhouse 
substances. 
2.2 Agents Forcing the Climate 
2.2.1 Carbon Dioxide and the Carbon Cycle 
The increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide is the largest and most complex of the human climate 
forcings. The quantity of this element in the Earth system is fixed and (abstracting from the carbon 
locked up in carbonate rocks) it is in four pools that can be seen in Figure 2: fossil deposits (from 
which it is released by combustion), the oceans (surface and deep oceans and sediments), vegetation 
and soils, and the atmosphere.
3
 Absent industrial development the carbon in fossil deposits was locked 
up on human time scales, but once released as CO2 it enters a process of continual cycling among the 
other pools. As shown by the blue arrows in the figure, there are large natural flows of CO2 in and out 
of the terrestrial biosphere (roughly 120 billion metric tons (Gt) per year) and somewhat smaller 
exchanges of CO2 in and out of the oceans. 
                                                     
3
 The figure is in terms of carbon quantities: to convert the flows to CO2 multiply by 3.6. 
Implications of Climate Science for Policy 
5 
Figure 2. Global Carbon Cycle for the 1990s. Main annual fluxes shown in Gt of carbon per year 
(US DOE EIA, 2004). 
 
Then comes the human influence, indicated by the dashed red arrows. In the 1990s we removed 6.3 Gt 
per year of carbon from fossil deposits and converted it to atmospheric CO2. Where did it go? There is 
a good deal of uncertainty about these numbers but, on average, part was taken up by the terrestrial 
biosphere (the difference between the two large arrows) and part by the oceans (also summarized by 
two arrows). The rest, about half, is accumulating in the atmosphere. An excellent illustration of how 
this process works is provided in a web video at http://www.youtube.com/carbontracker which shows 
the process from 1979 to 2011.
4
 The bulk of the Planet’s vegetation and soils are in the Northern 
Hemisphere, so they dominate the exchange with plants taking up CO2 in the spring and summer and 
releasing it in the fall and winter. The gradual buildup over time in the atmosphere is dramatically 
portrayed. Since the 1770s, CO2 in the atmosphere has increased from around 270 parts per million 
(ppm) to 390 ppm today. The video goes on to plot the CO2 levels back in time for several hundred 
thousand years using data from ice cores and other sources. The CO2 levels are correlated with 
temperature, so the path roughly traces the ice ages and warm periods of the distant past. 
Figure 2, also highlights a fact about this greenhouse gas to which we will return later: its “stock 
pollutant” nature. It can be illustrated by the following calculation, which is not exact given the 
complexities of the carbon cycle but nonetheless informative. We have added 160 to 170 GtC as of the 
1990s. If all human emissions were halted immediately, at what rate would the system return to its 
earlier state? Answer: the oceans and terrestrial biosphere would begin to remove the carbon at a rate 
of only around 4 GtC per year. Thus the climate influence of change already made to the Planet will 
continue for a very long time, even under the fantasy that we could halt all global emissions 
immediately. 
                                                     
4
 If this youtube version is not clear, the original file can be found at 
 ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/carbontracker/movies/Globalview2011_pumphandle.mp4. It requires the facility to play 
an mp4 movie. 
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2.2.2 Non-CO2 Gases 
Many gases can trap longwave energy, but the primary ones are listed in Table 1. Most are present in 
nature, but are augmented by industrial and farming activities. The most important is methane, which 
is released in fossil energy production and by agricultural activities that create conditions for methane-
producing bacteria such as rice growing, releases from the intestines of ruminant animals like cows 
and sheep, and manure management. Another important source of methane is leakage from natural gas 
pipelines and consumer appliances. Nitrous oxide also is released in fossil combustion and in some 
industrial activities, but has its main source in agriculture where nitrogen fertilizer stimulates the 
activity of other bacteria that produce this gas.  
Table 1. Non-CO2 Greenhouse Contributors 
 Sources Sinks 
Primary warming effects   
   Methane (CH4) Biogenic, fossil Destruction by OH 
   Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Biogenic, industrial UV radiation 
   Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6) Industrial, natural Extremely stable 
   Hydrofleurocarbons 
  (HFCs & HCFCs) Industrial, natural 
Destruction by OH 
  Perfleurocarbon (PFCs) Industrial, natural Extremely stable 
  Black carbon (aerosols) Fossil, biofuels, dust Deposition 
Knock-on warming  effects   
   Ozone (O3) Fossil Photochemistry 
Cooling  effects   
   Sulfate aerosol (SO2) Fossil  Deposition 
Then there are the industrial gases—HFCs and HCFCs used in air conditioning and various solvent 
applications, PFCs which are a by product of aluminum processing and are also manufactured for use 
in the electronics industry and other applications, and SF6 which is used mainly as an insulator in 
electric transformers.
5
  
Also shown in the table are the aerosols mentioned earlier, both the warming black aerosols and the 
reflecting sulfate aerosols that have a cooling effect. Then there is ozone, another greenhouse gas, 
which is emitted directly in infinitesimal quantities by human activity but is produced in the 
atmosphere by chemical action of two by-products of fossil fuel use: organic compounds from 
incomplete combustion and methane release, and NOx. (These influences will show up again below in 
discussion of mitigation strategies.) 
Each of the non-CO2 gases has limited residence time in the atmosphere (see Table 2). Carbon 
dioxide, which cycles in and out of the various pools, cannot be said to have a “lifetime”. At best 
estimates can be made of the approximate time an emitted molecule spends in the atmosphere before 
being absorbed into the terrestrial biosphere or the oceans—generally estimated to be somewhat over a 
century. All of the non-CO2 substances, on the other hand, are subject to some process of chemical 
destruction or deposition, so lifetimes can be estimated which range from around a dozen years for 
methane to thousands of years for some of the industrial gases. 
                                                     
5
 Other greenhouse gases, which are already controlled under the Montreal Protocol for protection of the Ozone layer, are 
not shown here. 
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2.2.3 The Magnitude of Natural and Human Forcings 
The contribution of these various substances in the long-run climate problem depends of course on the 
time each spends in the atmosphere, but an impression of their relative impact can be seen in an 
estimate of the changes in forcing by each over the period 1850 to 2005 (Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Major Natural and Human Forcings, W/m
2
, 1850-2005 (IPCC, 1997b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of each is shown in W/m
2
, with a total anthropogenic forcing at the bottom. The longer-
lived greenhouse gases, which are the ones included under the Kyoto protocol, are at the top of the 
figure, with CO2 being the dominant influence over this period. Ozone is shown, with a cooling 
influence in the stratosphere but a dominant warming effect in the lower atmosphere or troposphere. 
Also shown are the changes in surface albedo as a result of land-use change and the dirtying of snow 
and ice with black aerosols. The effects of the cooling aerosols are shown to be relatively large over 
this period, both by direct reflection of solar radiation and through their estimated effect on clouds. 
The whiskers shown for each greenhouse effect indicate levels of uncertainty in climate forcing. 
The heat trapping effect of the long-lived gases is pretty-well known. They are well mixed around the 
globe, and measurements of atmospheric concentrations are available for 1850 and 2005, so the 
uncertainty in their effects is small relative to the other influences. Uncertainty is greatest for the cloud 
albedo effect. 
One natural forcing is included in the figure, because it has been argued that observed warming 
may be due to changes in the Sun’s output. In fact the Sun is estimated to have brightened over the 55 
years, but the effect is small compared to the sum of human influences. Note also that the small 
forcing from water vapor is a direct effect of methane emissions and not the much larger feedback 
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effect of increased water in the atmosphere in response to higher temperature. Indeed, because the 
water vapor feedback is so large it is (along with the aerosol effect) a major source of uncertainty 
about the climate response going forward. Another big source of uncertainty is the behavior of the 
ocean. 
2.3 The Role of the Ocean 
The oceans play a dual role in the climate system, involving both CO2 and heat. They breathe CO2 in 
and out as seen in Figure 2, with an overall net annual uptake now because of the human emissions of 
CO2 into the atmosphere. And, as the atmospheric temperature rises the oceans absorb heat, in effect 
creating a “flywheel” effect that introduces a time lag in the effect of the human forcing. As a result 
the surface temperature is not yet in equilibrium with the current level of forcing shown in Figure 3; 
there is a yet unrealized “commitment” to further change in the climate even if human forcing were to 
stay at the current level.  
The driver of this process is the deep circulations in the ocean. The top hundred meters or so is will 
mixed by wave action, so on a global average this top layer stays in close equilibrium with the 
atmosphere in terms of CO2 and temperature. But this top layer alone could not hold the amount of 
additional CO2 implied by the estimates in Figure 2, or take up a great amount of heat in adjusting to a 
rising atmospheric temperature. The flywheel effect occurs because CO2-rich and warm water is taken 
from the so-called “mixed” layer and carried into the ocean deeps.  
The process is complex, even chaotic, but a cartoon of one of the main components is shown in 
Figure 4. This is the thermohaline (i.e., heat and salt) circulation. Warm water from the tropics is 
driven by the Gulf Stream to latitudes around New England or Southern Europe. Farther north, in the 
Norwegian Sea, the surface water becomes very cold (and therefore heavier than the water beneath), 
and in the formation of sea ice the salt is left in the surrounding water (also increasing its density). So 
patches of this water sink, drawing the Gulf Stream waters further north, and creating a return flow 
along the bottom of the Atlantic as shown in the figure. In the process CO2 is buried, and ocean 
regions below the mixed layer are warmed, taking up atmospheric heat. A similar process is initiated 
on the margins of Antarctica. 
Figure 4. Cartoon of the Deep Ocean Circulation (US NASA, 2004) 
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The time scale of these circulations if very long; some of these global circuits are estimated to take 
800 to 1000 years. They are only partially understood, and therefore ocean uptake is an important 
source of uncertainty in the pace of the climate’s response to human forcing. 
2.4 Feedbacks with Rising Temperature 
If these human forcings were all there was to climate change the threat would be much less serious 
than it is. But unfortunately there a number of system feedbacks to a rise in temperature, 
overwhelmingly positive ones that magnify the warming influence. Most important is the water vapor 
feedback. At warmer temperatures there is greater evaporation off the oceans, and a warmer 
atmosphere will hold more of the resulting water vapor, which is the most powerful greenhouse 
influence. 
Then there are changes in the Earth’s surface with warming. Rising temperatures are melting the 
Arctic sea ice, which returns solar energy back into space (see Figure 1). Over recent decades the loss 
of this reflective surface has been substantial. Figure 5 shows the satellite record of the ice extent in 
near the end of the Northern Hemisphere melting period in fall 2012 compared to its size in 1979-
2000. Changes in vegetation with climate can change reflectivity and emissions as well, with one of 
the more significant influences being increases in forest fires with rising temperature, releasing CO2 to 
the atmosphere. 
Figure 5. Fall Arctic Sea Ice Extent, 2012 Compared with 1979-2000 (NSIDC, 2012) 
 
Finally, the deep ocean circulations may respond as well to rising temperature. Salinity in the northern 
seas will decrease if less sea ice is formed, and their surface temperature will rise. Both changes are 
expected to contribute to a slowing of thermohaline circulation. Though the potential is yet 
insufficiently understood, and likely is a multi-century process, it is another positive feedback serving 
to multiply the direct effects of human influences. 
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3. Where Are We Now, and where are we headed? 
The globe is well into the process of climate change projected to result from these human activities 
and the feedbacks in the system. The scale of the influence, in relation to Earth’s history over the past 
20,000 years can be seen in Figure 6 which shows the atmospheric concentrations of the three most 
important human greenhouse gases, CO2, methane and nitrous oxide. For at least the past 20,000 years 
these concentrations were roughly constant, up to the beginning of the industrial age. On the lower 
right panel is displayed the pace of change in forcing in W/m
2
, which integrates these influences. 
The gases controlled under the Kyoto protocol are CO2, methane, nitrous oxide and a set of 
industrial gases (see Table 1) and a multi-gas total of the current concentrations can be estimated in 
CO2 equivalents (noted as CO2-e) using a set of relative weights discussed below. A concentration of 
around 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2-e of the Kyoto gases is the stabilization level that some 
studies associate with a 50% chance of meeting a widely agreed goal of a maximum 2°C global 
temperature increase over the pre-industrial level (Webster et al., 2012). In 2012 the globe is at about 
445 ppm CO2-e and increasing at approximately 3 ppm per year. 
Figure 6. Atmospheric GHG Concentrations, 20,000 years (IPCC, 2007) 
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The associated change in the surface temperature over the past 130 years is laid out in Figure 7. The 
change is shown as the anomaly or change from an average of 1940-1960. The oceans can cool 
themselves by evaporation, so note that the change over land is greater than the global total. 
Figure 7. Global Surface Temperature Anomalies, January-August (US NOAA, 2012) 
The global temperature increase over the period is about 0.8°C, with nine of the ten warmest years 
since 2000. In addition, it is estimated (IPCC, 1997b) that with current concentrations we are already 
committed to additional 0.6°C which we will experience only after the delay caused by ocean uptake 
of heat mentioned earlier.  
Projections vary, but analysis by the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy for Global 
Change (Sokolov et al., 2009; Webster et al., 2012) indicates a wide range of global temperature 
outcomes if no further mitigation is undertaken, with a median (50% above, 50% below) of around 
5°C by 2100 (and this is above 1990). This result is shown in the form of a roulette wheel on the left 
side of Figure 8. To illustrate the effect on the climate risk of mitigation policy, the wheel on the right 
shows the gamble if it proved possible to limit the concentrations (of Kyoto gases) to 650 ppm. Even 
then, the globe is expected to be in for substantial change, although the high-end of the risk is greatly 
diminished. 
Figure 8. Global Climate Risk (Sokolov et al., 2009; Webster et al., 2012) 
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4. Where the Science Impinges on Policy Action 
4.1 Contradicts Common Mental Models of System Behavior 
The first challenge presented by the science of the climate change is the difficulty in understanding the 
nature and magnitude of the threat. Research on human behavior shows that most of us carry around a 
mental model of emissions and their effects—of pollution, that is—that is seriously at odds with these 
effects at planetary scale. It is not just that much of the population lacks scientific literacy, or that the 
heuristics all of us use in decision-making are subject to a number of errors biases (for a summary, see 
Kahneman, 2011). We are particularly bad at thinking though the effects of intervention in a complex 
system like the Earth’s climate (Sterman, 2011). 
For example, misunderstanding is created by the fact that we are dealing with long-term change in 
a system that is very noisy at the scale that most people experience it. The result is frequent confusion, 
in the media and in lay understanding, between climate (where change is only seen over many 
decades) and weather (our year-to-year experience). We have a tendency to base impressions of 
change on recent experience (an availability bias) and thus to credit the projections of global warming 
in a particularly hot month, but question the science in an unusually cold one.  
To see the seriousness of the challenge, take a look at the pattern of temperature change over the 
globe in the past century in a video prepared by the U.S. NASA 
(http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/2011-temps.html). First, view the sequence while focusing 
on the place where you are. What would your experience tell about change over time? Then back off 
and view again, taking in the global picture. People experience the temperature and rain or snowfall 
where they live, and it is a challenge to overcome this impression based on global measurements and 
scientific calculations that most have scant basis to understand. (A map of precipitation would show 
even more variation over space and time.) 
Another source of difficulty is poor understanding of systems of stocks and flows. It is not that we 
lack experience with such dynamics: we deal with them all the time in filling a bathtub, managing a 
bank account or worrying about our weight. But there is ample evidence of widespread difficulty in 
grasping the fundamental stock-flow aspect of greenhouse gases (Sterman, 2011). As emphasized 
above, what matters to the climate are the concentrations of CO2 and other substances in the 
atmosphere, and to stabilize concentrations the rate of emissions must be brought down to equal the 
rate of uptake or destruction. Unfortunately, it is widely perceived that simply stabilizing emissions 
will stabilize concentrations. It is a mental model consistent with other pollution problems—like noise 
or river pollution—but wrong in this context.  
Related to the stock-flow problem is an incorrect appreciation of the role of time delays in the 
system. Two examples will make the point. A common argument in policy discussions, in the face of 
uncertainty, is to “wait and learn”. Again, for many environmental issues this is a sound mental model, 
because the seriousness of the problem will be roughly the same in a few years and we may then know 
better how to deal with it. But it is wrong in this case: for a stock pollutant the threat does get worse 
with delay because the stock in the atmosphere is increasing. Contributing to this problem is poor 
understanding of ocean circulations, and the time delay they introduce into climate response to 
forcing. Because we are committed to change we have not yet seen, impressions of the threat based on 
current conditions or change to date are further flawed. 
These problems of inadequate mental models of climate change not only influence public 
understanding of the science and choices faced; they also provide opportunities for argument by those 
opposed to action. Thus policy in this area needs to include a continuing effort to inform, putting 
scientific results into language that avoids further increasing these difficulties.  
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4.2 Requires Attention to Multiple, Diverse, Poorly Measured Influences 
Managing an environmental threat is easier if there is one focus for a response. For example, if 
overfishing is depleting ocean stocks, then the solution is limits on catch. Unfortunately, climate-
forcing activities are spread across the modern industrial/agricultural economy; no such simple control 
is adequate. Figure 9 shows a projection of total GHG emissions assuming no further control beyond 
those in place in 2011. Most discussions of climate policy naturally focus on fossil CO2 emissions, the 
largest component of human influence. Whatever the global target, however, stabilization of 
atmospheric concentrations by the end of the century requires control of all these GHG sources (plus 
black carbon aerosols not shown here) at a level of stringency sufficient to cut their total contribution 
to levels that can be absorbed or destroyed by Earth processes.  
Figure 9. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions (MIT JP, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The atmospheric concentrations of all these gases are accurately measured around the globe on a 
regular basis. Emissions present greater measurement problems. For some GHGs the sources are 
known and well measured. This is true, for example, for fossil CO2 emissions and the industrial gases 
(PFCs, HFCs and SF6). For others, however, the science does not support accurate quantification. As 
noted above, farming practices the main sources of methane and nitrous oxide and these sources are 
highly dispersed, which also is the case for methane released from natural gas infrastructure. Estimates 
are made, to support emissions inventories prepared by national governments and by individual sectors 
and emitters. But means are lacking to measure these so-called non-point sources at sufficient 
accuracy to support regulatory or price penalties.  
Similar problems arise in the measurement of emissions from forests destruction, mainly in the 
tropics, which is the main component to the land CO2 component in Figure 9. Despite a great deal of 
effort to combine on-ground and satellite measurement the irreducible error creates problems in 
application to systems of penalty and reward.  
A further problem of emissions quantification arises in calculations that appear to be grounded in 
the science of climate but that in fact contain elements that lie beyond the domain of scientific 
disciplines. In deciding the allocation of mitigation effort there is a need to be able to express the 
relative importance of the various GHGs. The mix of these gases varies among nations, and some 
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weighting scheme is also needed to be able to compute totals for discussion of equity among parties. 
Also, such weights are required if there is to be emissions trading among the gases. The ideal would be 
a measure of relative future economic and ecological damage attributable to each, or even a measure 
of the contribution to future temperature increase. Such measures raise insurmountable obstacles of 
uncertainty and estimation, however, so the solution has been to pick an intermediate level of climate 
influence: the effect of each on radiative forcing over time—the Global Warming Potential or GWP 
(Table 2). The GWP provides the relative weights needed to convert all gases into CO2 equivalents, as 
applied in Figures 8 and 9. 
Table 2. Global Warming Potentials for Different Integration Periods (IPCC, 2007b) 
The GWPs are calculated by simulating a pulse of each gas in a climate model, tracking the influence 
on W/m
2 
over time, and summing the influences.
6
 The results then differ by the heat-trapping power of 
each substance and the speed by which it is either taken up by the oceans and terrestrial biosphere or 
destroyed in the atmosphere. In this calculation there is one key input that the science cannot resolve: 
what should be the integration period over which the calculation is made? A short period gives more 
weight to shorter-lived gases and vice versa. Table 2 shows the effect of using a 20, 100 or 500 year 
period. Through agreements in the IPCC nations have decided to use the 100-year GWPs for 
reporting, trading agreements, etc., but much controversy remains. For example, when there is a focus 
on climate effects over the next few decades there is an argument for using the 20-year GWP in order 
to give a proper weight to methane on this time horizon. If done the change would triple the weight 
given a ton of methane in relation to a ton of CO2. A question also remains whether an additional 
relative weight should be imposed on methane for its knock-on effect on the generation of ozone, a 
greenhouse gas that also damages CO2-absorbing vegetation. 
4.3 Demands Cooperative Effort by Parties with Diverse Interests 
Over past decades nations have developed policy regimes to deal with a number of international 
environmental problems ranging from the disposal of toxic waste to protection of endangered species. 
For some the number of major players was small, simplifying the process of agreement if interests in 
the issue were aligned. For example, only a small number of nations are relevant to agreements to 
lower stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and in the case of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer only a few nations were producing the offending chemicals. For the climate 
issue the commons problem is truly global. Though not all nations are essential to reducing the risk, a 
large number are. Moreover their interests lack alignment in crucial dimensions. 
The nature of this aspect of the challenge can be seen in Figure 10, a projection to 2050 of energy 
use (the main source of GHG emissions) assuming no mitigation efforts beyond those in place in 
2012. The Developed Country group includes the U.S., E.U., Japan, Canada, and 
                                                     
6
 The lifetimes in Table 2 do not indicate when the pulse has completely disappeared from the atmosphere but when the 
number of molecules is reduced by 1/e where e=2.72. 
	 Lifetime 
(Years)	
Time Horizon (TH) in Years 
20 100 500 
Methane 12 72 25 7.6 
Nitrous Oxide 114 289 298 153 
HFC-23 270 12,000 14,800 12,200 
HFC-134a 14 3,830 1,430 435 
SF6 3200 16,300 22,800 32,600 
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Figure 10. Projected Energy Use by Region (MIT JP, 2012) 
 
Australia and New Zealand, and their energy use is projected to be flat over the period. The main 
growth is in the Other G20, which for the model applied in this analysis includes Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico, Russia and a set of dynamic Asian countries. The Rest of World aggregates everybody else. 
The science makes clear that the planet doesn’t care where the long-lived GHG emissions originate, so 
to make any substantial reduction in human influence the G20 as a whole must be involved. For the 
tighter emissions targets those nations outside the G20 cannot be left unrestrained.  
Obvious in this picture, then, is a serious misalignment of interests. A reduction in emissions can 
be imagined for the Developed group, because they are relatively rich, and even without additional 
effort their emissions are not expected to grow much. On the other hand all of the Other G20 are 
nations are at much lower income levels and so more sensitive to the costs of emissions control (Table 
3). Moreover, most are either in a period of rapid economic development or aspiring to be so. Any 
effective international agreement must achieve perceived equity among participants while producing 
big cuts in emissions. The challenge to international institution is evident in the 20-year history of the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Table 3. Projected Per-Capita GDP (2004 prices) and CO2 Emissions (metric tons) in 2015 (MIT 
JP, 2011) 
 Per Capita, 2015 
GDP CO2 Emissions 
U.S.        43,000           19.3 
E.U.        28,000             7.9 
Brazil          5,410             2.3 
China          1,380             7.2 
India          1,120             1.9 
4.4 Reveals Uncertainty that Complicates Mitigation Decision 
As noted above, each member of a large family of climate models projects change over this century 
and beyond, but they differ in important details of future patterns of temperature and precipitation. 
Moreover, uncertainty analysis using a single model (Figure 8) reveals great uncertainty even if 
emissions uncertainty is removed (as in the right-hand wheel in the figure). These results reflect the 
current state of the science as employed in projections of the behavior of the climate system in 
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response to human influence. Nevertheless, they clearly suggest serious future risk to ecosystems and 
national economies.  
Unfortunately, this unavoidable level of uncertainty also impedes the formulation of commitment 
to reduce the risk. Some participants in the policy process simply don’t trust the science. And even 
those with respect for the science may interpret the uncertainty to mean that understanding is yet 
insufficient to justify action to limit emissions. At worst, the issue is cast as a matter of “belief”. In this 
formulation climate change is either real or it is not, like the virgin birth, and uncertainty in scientific 
analyses is taken as indicating a lack of proof. Proper application of the science will cast the climate 
threat not as a true-false question (act urgently if it is real; do noting if it is not) but as a challenge of 
risk management. This is a way of thinking about decision under uncertainty that we apply all the time 
in our private lives (e.g., how radically to change diet to lower cholesterol and the risk of heart 
disease) and in public decision (how aggressively to pursue a vaccination program to manage the risk 
of flu epidemic). The debate of climate policy has been too often driven away from this way of 
formulating the choice, however, and correction of this mis-definition would go a long way to 
overcoming the barriers created by unavoidable uncertainty about the magnitude of the threat. 
Even given acceptance of climate change as a serious risk, limits to our understanding also lead to 
difficulties in deciding the proper response. This is in part because the science cannot yet support 
precise quantitative descriptions of what the uncertainties actually are—a shortcoming has come to be 
known as the problem of “fat tails”. To frame the issue, consider the following question: What should 
be the CO2 price in the European Trading System? Most observers would agree that the price at the 
time of this writing (around €7 per ton CO2) is too low, but also that €150 would be too high. Where 
do these views come from? Apart from notions of political feasibility, which no doubt intervene, a 
substantial influence is a concept in economics that the policy task is to appropriately spread pain over 
time. Emissions now will cause damage in the future (say, in lost consumption), and we can lower 
future pain by taking some penalty now (diverting current consumption to emissions mitigation). 
Impressions of future economic and environmental damage may be foggy, and the way future and 
current costs are compared may be obscure, but the underlying conception is nonetheless common, 
and not just among economists. It leads to opinions about the price today and to the expectation that it 
should rise over time as future emissions are expected to cause larger incremental damage. 
This benefit-cost way of thinking about mitigation effort is implemented in policy procedures. For 
example, for federal rulemakings and other policy decisions the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget requires an analysis of monetary costs and benefits. To this end the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency must prepare an analysis of the monetary benefit of reducing a current ton of 
CO2—what is called the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC)—to be compared with the cost of measures to 
limit emissions (US EPA, 2010). The estimation of the SCC is based on a set of computer models that 
simulate the temperature effect of an additional ton of CO2 today, impose a mathematical function to 
represent estimated damage of that change in the future, and (employing some discount rate) smooth 
the pain over time in a way that maximizes some measure of human welfare.
7
 
The same formulation is applied when the analysis includes formal representations of uncertainty 
in these processes. To highlight difficulties of the climate issue, consider the simpler case of river 
pollution by urban waste. For a given waste discharge there is uncertainty in the resulting water 
quality—because of uncertainty in flow, temperature, biological processes, etc. And whatever the 
water quality in the river there is uncertainty in the damage, say in fish kills and human disease. To 
calculate the benefit of reducing urban discharge the range of potential water quality outcomes can be 
weighted by their probabilities to compute an expected quality level. And potential but uncertain 
levels of damage, for that expected river quality, can be weighted by their probabilities to yield an 
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 There are, of course, many difficulties with such analyses, not least being the valuation of non-market effects and the 
choice of discount rate, but here the focus is on issues in the underlying climate science. 
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overall estimate of the expected benefit of a reduction in discharge.
8
 For water pollution this is a 
credible and easily understood calculation because we have extensive experience with the biology of 
rivers and with the effects of polluted waters on fish and human health.  
Now consider the difference with anthropogenic climate change. We have just one planet, and 
human greenhouse emissions are pushing some of its climate processes outside the experience of the 
past 20,000 years (see Figure 6) and longer. This means that estimates of the parameters of uncertainty 
measures of climate response are themselves uncertain. (Various names are given to this condition 
including deep uncertainty and structural uncertainty).  
As an example, look again wheel on the right side of Figure 8, where policy constraint removes the 
uncertainty in emissions. Underlying the uncertainty in that projection are estimates, based heavily on 
analysis of climate behavior in the 20
th
 Century, of the parameters (e.g., mean, variance) of probability 
distributions of cloud behavior and aerosol effects (Figure 3), deep ocean circulations (Figure 4), and 
aspects of CO2 emissions from the terrestrial biosphere (Figure 2). The resulting probability 
distribution that was re-stated in the form of the Figure 8 roulette wheel is shown in Figure 11. The 
distribution for the policy (650 ppm) case looks like a 
Figure 11. PDFs of Temperature Change for No Policy and a 650 ppm Target (Webster et al., 
2011) 
 
bell-shaped curve (a normal distribution) whose tails are pretty “thin”: under the 650 ppm target the 
probability of a temperature increase exceeding 4°C is near zero. However, given that the uncertainty 
parameters are based on a single planet, with limited data about this one, these parameters are 
themselves uncertain. So, if we could take this parameter uncertainty into account the resulting 
distribution would be more spread out. To use the term introduced earlier, it has an unseen “fat” upper 
tail. The science often cannot support a precise description of what is out there in the tail and when it 
might happen; moreover, even where events can be described scientific support may be lacking to 
estimate how likely they are. 
Examples of such phenomena in the climate response include the potential for warming to release 
huge quantities of methane now trapped in clathrates (ice crystals in the Arctic and in ocean 
sediments), or a rapid slowdown in the deep ocean circulations. In the damage estimates such tail 
events include the potential for rapid melting of Greenland and collapse of the West Antarctic ice 
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 To see this done for climate using an integrated assessment model see Nordhaus, 2008.  
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sheet, leading to several meters of sea level rise; and the possible damage to ocean biota and the food 
web of CO2-induced acidification of ocean waters.
9
  
If societal aversion to these low-probability but high-consequence outcomes is very great, then the 
adequacy of the standard benefit-cost approach to informing mitigation effort is called into question. 
Indeed, some (admittedly restrictive) conditions of probability, consequence and risk aversion lead to 
a collapse of the concepts underlying benefit-cost analysis with its objective of appropriately 
smoothing consumption over time (Weitzman, 2009, 2011).
10
 The policy objective then becomes 
focused on buying insurance against catastrophe. Even short of these extreme cases, however, the 
phenomenon of fat tails means that most benefit-cost estimates of mitigation effort—valuable as they 
are in tuning intuition—do not convey the whole story. Aversion to risks that the science cannot yet 
quantify will be an important influence on policy deliberations, leaning toward a more aggressive 
current response than the standard benefit-cost analysis would indicate, and to support for those who 
would inject the precautionary principle into policy debates.  
This state of scientific understanding of the climate system calls for the use of policy instruments 
that can be flexible over time as earth-system knowledge is gained. (The same conclusion emerges 
from consideration of uncertainty in the costs of control. and this concern arises in decisions about 
adaptation as well as for mitigation.) As in most problems of risk management under uncertainty, 
climate policy is best thought of as facilitating a process of sequential decision: act now based on 
current knowledge, learn over time, and revise later based on any new information. It is a model of the 
policy process that is consistent with the fact that governments cannot make commitments for long 
periods of time, but its implications are not always considered in formulating the details of mitigation 
proposals. 
4.5 Creates Special Difficulty in Formulating Adaptation Measures 
Whatever success we may have in limiting greenhouse emissions the Planet faces changes in climate 
to which human and natural systems will have to adapt. Many of these adjustments will take place 
gradually, in response to change as experienced year to year, “on the ground” as it were. For example, 
shifts in rainfall and temperature will change the economics of different crops and where they are 
grown, leading to shifts over time; changes in atmospheric conditions and availability of food supplies 
will lead to changes in migration patterns of birds, other animals and insects. Indeed some of these 
effects are seen in the response of natural systems to the climate change already experienced. 
However, some adaptation could be very expensive if it is not possible to anticipate what is 
coming. For example, large capital facilities underlie the water management systems that support 
irrigated agriculture and industrial and residential water services. These systems take a long time to 
develop and are very costly, so systems built now need to take account of conditions under projected 
climate change, and appropriate near-term revision of existing systems could lower the economic loss 
when the climate change comes. For instance, a change in mountain runoff from slowly melting snow 
to winter and spring rainfall may call for substantial revision in the design of irrigation systems and 
the water storage reservoirs that support them. Without a change in technology electric powerplants 
may not be able to depend on streams and rivers for the quantity and temperature of flow needed for 
cooling. 
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 The fat tail problem is not unique to climate change. For example, biotechnology research to engineer the bird flue virus 
to become transmittable among humans, seeking benefits in formulating ways to handle an epidemic should the mutation 
come naturally, carries an unquantifiable tail risk of escape from the lab into the wild. Similar concerns can be found in 
areas like genetically engineered crops, nanotechnology and nuclear proliferation. 
10
 The relevance of the fat tails problem is intensively debated in the economics literature, with an informative exchange 
provided by Weitzman (2011) and Nordhaus (2011). The issue also troubles the estimate in the U.S. of the social cost of 
carbon: see the technical note that can be downloaded at US EPA (2010).  
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Or, to take a regulatory example, many governments compute maps of likely flooding from rivers and 
streams and use this information in determining zoning regulations, requirements for the design of 
structures flood zones, and insurance rates. These estimates determine the location of large swathes of 
urban and industrial activity and thus the risks to which they will be subject in the future. Many 
governments and private industries are already trying to formulate investment and regulatory policies 
that anticipate potential change in the hope of lowering the associated economic cost and social 
disruption.  
But here again the climate science intercedes. The uncertainty in future change at global scale is 
already great, as indicated in Figure 8. But adaptation decisions depend on climate conditions at local 
scale: the particular agricultural zone, valley or river basin. At these local scales the uncertainty in 
future change is even greater. Even computer models of the climate that agree on change at global 
scale may yield estimates of the change in runoff in a particular river basin that differ not only in 
magnitude but also in sign: some project more water, some less. Indeed it is a general characteristic 
Earth systems that the smaller the region of interest the greater the additional uncertainty in modelling 
the climate change effects. Another pass through the 20
th
 Century 
(http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/2011-temps.html) suggests this result should be no 
surprise. 
The implication for policy of the higher level of uncertainty is that the planning of anticipatory 
adaptation, be it by investment or regulatory change, needs to be based on an expression of the full 
uncertainty of future projections at local scale. Decisions made on the basis of one or two scenarios 
could lead to costly decisions, and very often the proper response may be to provide more flexibility 
for adjusting to future conditions that cannot now be specified even though there is a high likelihood 
that some change is coming. 
5. Combined effects on the Choice of Response Strategy 
The formulation of strategy to deal with the climate change threat is greatly complicated by the 
combination of these various characteristics of the issue. The magnitude of the climate challenge can 
again be highlighted in contrast to a superficially similar problem: formulating a respond to the threat 
to the stratospheric ozone layer by a set of industrial gases. In negotiation of the Montreal Protocol the 
interest of the main parties (developed countries and firms that produced these gases) were aligned, a 
narrow set of gases were at issue, corresponding policy on adaptation to increased UV radiation was 
not an issue, and compensation of nations adjusting to the change was easily handled. It is not so easy 
with climate, where 
 Participation is required by parties whose interests are not aligned 
 Emissions with different origins and lifetimes, some poorly measured, must be dealt with 
 Adaptation is a serious issue and not completely separate from mitigation  
 Uncertainty is greater and harder to quantify 
 Involvement of both rich and poor nations will require financial substantial differences in effort 
according to ability and likely some financial assistance. 
And, of course these same issues serve to complicate not only international agreement but also the 
formulation of the domestic actions within each country. 
Given these characteristics of the climate issue, the appropriate strategy for the needed international 
response remains unclear even after two decades of struggle. Is it to best to follow the Montreal 
Protocol model and seek a global agreement covering all nations and all these issues? This is the 
strategy underlying the various stages of negotiation under the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, including the latest effort under the Durban Platform (UN FCCC, 2011). Is it likely more 
productive to focus on various “club” agreements, which may be build around groups where interests 
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are more closely aligned (e.g., the Asia-Pacific Partnership, Major Economies Forum, G-20, G8+5)? 
Or is a set of bilateral agreements among major players the way forward?  
There is even a choice of which of the human influences should be the focus in any agreement. 
Negotiations in the Framework Convention have taken (on all at once) long-lived and short-lived 
gases weighted by the Global Warming Potentials in Table 2. An alternative suggested by UNEP and 
WMO (2011) is to seek an agreement focused on short-lived substances—methane, and black 
carbon—motivated in part that agreement may be facilitated by the non-climate co-benefits that would 
result from the reduction in air pollution. Or is it likely that this combination of problem 
characteristics will necessarily lead to a combination of all, in a loosely coordinated regime “complex” 
(Keohane and Victor, 2010)?
11
 Though one can hope national interests may come to be better aligned, 
the scientific characteristics of the climate threat are not likely to change in coming decades, so the 
complications it introduces will continue. 
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 Expectation of this outcome is consistent with a more formal analysis of “polycentric” governance as applied to climate 
change by Cole (2011). 
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